John
Lampe, Executive Vice President, Remarks Prepared for Delivery
Before House Commerce Committee Subcommittees on Oversight
and Investigations and Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer
Protection, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 21, 2000)
Chairman
Tauzin, Chairman Upton and members of the House Commerce Committee,
Bridgestone/Firestone is pleased to have the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss some very important issues
regarding the tire recall situation.
Let me repeat at the outset
that BFS recognizes that there was a problem with a very small
percentage of the recalled tires. We must and do take full
responsibility for these problems. Before going into the substance
of my remarks, let me tell you that this recall situation
has impacted our company as no other event has in our 100
year history. We are a proud company with a century long tradition
of customer service and satisfaction. The fact that our customers
are now questioning our commitment to them and to their safety
has shaken us to our core. We are fully committed to concluding
this recall as quickly as possible and to identifying the
cause or causes of the tire problems.
I will limit my opening
remarks to three subjects – Recommended PSI for tires to be
equipped on the Explorer; how tires are tested; and a brief
update on the root cause analysis of the problems with the
recalled tires.
First, air pressure.
As is the case with all vehicles, the vehicle manufacturer
sets the air pressure on the Explorer. Why? Because the vehicle
is an integrated system and the tires are only a part of that
system. Air pressure of the tire is interrelated with many
performance characteristics, including handling, rollover
stability, traction, suspension, and load. We are not vehicle
experts and cannot know what impact various pressure settings
will have on the vehicle system as a whole. Typically, from
our perspective, if the inflation level meets Tire and Rim
load standards at 26 PSI and the vehicle manufacturer believes
that 26 PSI is optimal for the vehicle’s performance, we must
rely on that judgment.
We now know that at 26
PSI, there is a low safety margin for the Explorer as compared
to other SUV’s. Running an Explorer at low tire pressures,
overloaded, particularly in hot climates appears to be a serious
part of the problem we are now facing. Since August 9, Ford
has stated that an inflation pressure range of 26 PSI to 30
PSI is proper for the P235/75R15 tires equipped on the Explorer
and we, as the tire manufacturer, have recommended that the
air pressure on these tires equipped on the Explorer be inflated
to 30PSI. We believe very strongly that 30 PSI provides the
consumer with additional safety margin; at 30 PSI, the Explorer
can handle higher speeds and over 400 lbs. greater load than
at 26 PSI. So strongly, in fact, that yesterday, we wrote
Ford to urge them to change the specification on Explorers
with P235/75R15 tires to 30 PSI.
Turning to testing, Firestone
knows how to test tires. Every year we test thousands of tires
for millions of miles at different loads, speeds and inflation
levels. We subject test tires to severe abuse and test to
create failure, so we can assess the outer limits of a tire's
ability to perform.
The recalled tires were
subjected to a series of exacting tests before they were introduced.
First, Ford Motor Company required a series of tests before
the tires could be certified as original equipment on Ford
vehicles. Those tests were performed either by Ford or by
Firestone, as directed by Ford in its engineering specifications.
Second, Firestone tested the tires in accordance with DOT
regulations, which call for high speed, durability, and other
tests. Third, at Ford’s request starting with the 1995 model
year, Firestone tested the tires under standards developed
by the Society of Automotive Engineers for purposes of speed
rating the tires.
In addition to this extensive
testing, Firestone's quality assurance procedures require
regular testing of tires taken from the production lines to
assure the continuing safety of our tires.
Overall, the testing Ford
and Firestone undertook before introducing these tires was
thorough and complete. However, we pledge our cooperation
with the Committee and with NHTSA in re-evaluating tire testing
standards and in addressing the critical matter of tire and
vehicle interaction in accident causation.
Let me speak a moment
about root cause. After the recall was announced, Bridgestone/Firestone
management immediately created an investigative team to study
and determine the cause of the tread separation phenomena.
They were joined by groups of personnel from the Decatur,
IL plant, professionals from the Akron Technical Center, and
field engineers and technical experts from around the United
States as well as from our parent company Bridgestone Corporation,
Japan. A team of Ford Motor Company specialists has also participated
in that effort. All of these groups have continued to work
both individually and jointly in search of an answer to this
problem.
No one wants to have an
answer more than we do. We have been and are continuing to
relentlessly examine all known facts relevant to these tires.
A comprehensive review of the Decatur production process has
been conducted to determine whether variances in any production
process could have caused or contributed to this problem,
which appears in such a small percentage of these tires.
At this time, I want to
make it clear that we have not been able to come to any conclusion
about the cause or causes of this problem, although we have
identified some areas where we believe additional work will
be fruitful. Specifically, we are looking at the interaction
between the design of the P235/75R15 and potential manufacturing
variances at the Decatur plant. It would be inappropriate
on my part to engage in further speculation. We must allow
our experts, including the independent expert, Dr. Sanjay
Govindjee, the unfettered opportunity to investigate and answer
this problem which as been aptly likened to "finding
a needle in a haystack."
Let there be no misunderstanding:
we take full responsibility when there is a problem with our
tires. We firmly believe, however, that the tire is only part
of the overall safety problem shown by these tragic accidents.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, let me be very
clear; we could remove every one of our tires from the Explorer,
and rollovers and serious accidents will continue.
Mr. Chairman, we pledge
our cooperation with the Committee and with NHTSA to work
to ensure the safety of the motoring public. Thank you for
your time and we welcome any questions the Committee has.
Joining me here today are Dan Saurer, Vice President, Technology
Company, and Brian Queiser, Project Engineer, who will address
any of the more technical questions you may have.
